RTAs and South Asia: options in the wake of Cancun fiasco by Mehta, Pradeep S & Kumar, Pranav








Ever since the collapse of Cancun Ministerial and the US Trade Representative Robert 
Zoellick’s reiteration to go for bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs) in a 
subsequent press conference, the debate on multilateralism vs. regionalism got a fresh 
impetus. It is being widely feared that the collapse of WTO trade talks may shift nations’ 
focus to bilateral or regional pacts.  
 
Already, the formation of the WTO did not halt the proliferation of new RTAs. There has 
been an enormous increase in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in the last twenty years. 
In fact, RTAs legitimacy is well recognised under GATT/WTO. By their very nature, such 
arrangements favour imports from members of the grouping and discriminate against imports 
from other countries. This departure from the MFN principle is permitted by Article XXIV of 
the GATT.  
 
As of March 2003, only four WTO Members: Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; Mongolia, 
and Chinese Taipei were not parties to a regional trade agreement. With the sole exception of 
Mongolia, these WTO Members are all engaged in negotiations on preferential agreements.  
At present, preferential regional trade agreements account for 43 per cent of world trade, and 
this is expected to increase to 55 per cent by 2005 if all the RTAs currently in the pipeline are 
realised (OECD, 2003). 
 
The growing popularity of RTAs has also ignited South Asian countries to create a South 
Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA). Though South Asia is a geographically integrated 
region, the economic integration level is still low despite a number of initiatives taken by the 
various stakeholders. The SAPTA was formed way back in 1993, but in true sense it remains 
a non-starter.     
 
Hence, the fear of a sudden spurt in RTAs is little unwarranted. The main concern is not their 
increase but whether growing regionalism and its further deepening and widening in the wake 
of poor progress of trade talks under the WTO can undermine the multilateral trading system. 
Moreover, the Cancun fiasco has further strengthened the belief of those who are ardent 
advocate of “regionalism could be building blocks of future multilateralism”. 
 
Supporters of RTAs maintain that these agreements have enabled countries to liberalise trade 
and investment barriers to a far greater degree than multilateral trade negotiations allow. 
Proponents also argue that regional agreements have gone beyond trade liberalisation, taking 
important steps toward harmonising regulations, adopting minimum standards for 
regulations, and recognising other countries’ standards and practices’ — trends that enhance 
market access (World Bank 1999/2000).      
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While the renewed momentum for multilateral trade liberalisation and rule making launched 
at Doha could have helped reduce the risks of regionalism being pursued as a preferred 
course, but many trade experts are of the view that the failed ministerial at Cancun may force 
WTO members to place an even greater emphasis on regional initiatives. The USA has made 
it that it will now redouble efforts to sign bilateral and regional free trade agreements, which 
are easier to negotiate than WTO agreements.  
 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to systematically address the situation in general and 
with emphasis on South Asia if the failed trade talks at Cancun throw weight behind the 
formation of more and more bilateral and regional trade treaties. Should they make a renewed 
effort to kick-start SAPTA? Should they look eastward and try to cooperate more with 
ASEAN and other East Asian economies? Should they further deepen trading relations with 
their traditional partners – the EU and US?  
 
This paper contains six sections (including introduction). Section II provides a quick recap of 
the series of events, which resulted in Cancun debacle. Section III takes into account the 
proliferation of RTAs over the last two decades, change in US’ approach towards 
regionalism, further deepening and widening of EU and formation of Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation. Section IV in very brief follows the development since the Cancun collapse, the 
US’ efforts to follow bilateral path in FTAA negotiations and India’s “Look East” policy. 
Section V analyses the reasons behind low intra-regional trade. Section VI makes a 
comparison of intra-SAARC trade with other Southern RTAs, Finally the paper ends with 
looking into the possible options for South Asia in the post-Cancun scenario.      
   
II. Revisiting Cancun 
 
Before discussing the post-Cancun scenario, let us have a quick recap of the series of events, 
culminating into the “Cancun catastrophe”. Like Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and 
previous ministerial meetings, Cancun was also no exception as far as agriculture playing the 
spoilsport is concerned. First, it caused serious crisis during the Uruguay Round, causing 
undue delay in the conclusion of the Round. As per the original schedule, the Uruguay Round 
was to be completed by 1990, but it got extended by three years and finally concluded in 
1993. The second time, at Seattle, talks failed mainly because there were serious differences 
over liberalisation in agriculture. Labour standards, however, was made the scapegoat. And 
finally, at Cancun, it was agriculture once again. However, this time the blame was passed on 
to the Singapore issues, especially investment. 
 
Agriculture dominated the first three days of the negotiations. The tug-of-war between the G-
202 combine and the European Union (EU) over farm subsidies virtually overshadowed all 
other issues, including the Singapore ones. Both, the EU and the US, tried their best to break 
this alliance. But when they did not succeed, they resorted to the “Plan B” of their strategy, 
i.e. antagonising developing countries to the extent that the Ministerial collapses. The 
inclusion of Singapore issues in the second revised ministerial draft (the first during the 
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ministerial), particularly investment, was a part of this strategy. It was a trap, in which the 
developing countries fell easily. 
 
Following the failure of the EU and the US in splitting the G-20 alliance, the way the 
negotiations were conducted gives enough indication that the course of events was fixed in 
advance by the developed countries, especially the US. The delay in bringing in the second 
revised draft ministerial declaration, tying up of investment with agriculture and the final 
hasty wrap-up of talks by the Chairman are some of the links in the chain of events that leave 
a trail of unanswered questions and, therefore, call for a clarification. 
 
Last time, at Doha, when the developed countries were determined to launch a new round of 
trade negotiations, the ministerial was extended by a day to arrive at a consensus. But in 
sharp contrast, in Cancun, when the developing countries, led by G-20, were successful in 
putting the developed countries in the dock on agriculture subsidies issue, the latter called a 
halt on the ministerial itself. 
 
Why the delay in bringing out the revised draft ministerial declaration? The text was released 
at noon on 13th September and in the afternoon the next day; the Chairman announced, 
“collapse” of the Ministerial. Less than 24 hours were given to reach a consensus on such 
contentious issues as investment, competition, trade facilitation and transparency in 
government procurement. Was the Chairman not aware that in seven years (since the 
Singapore Ministerial of 1996), both protagonists and antagonists could not budge an inch 
from their original positions? Then, how did he expect members to arrive at a consensus in 
less than 24 hours? 
 
If we recall the Doha Ministerial, 2001, the revised draft came out on 13th November and the 
Ministerial concluded on the 15th. So, three full days were devoted to negotiations before the 
final consensus. At that time, developed countries had a clear interest in making the 
Ministerial successful, because, they were interested in launching a new round of trade 
negotiations, while environment was also part of the agenda and more importantly, new 
issues were included in the Doha Work Programme. So, they did everything – from arm-
twisting to giving sops to least developed countries (LDCs). 
 
In the revised draft, the quid pro quo between investment and agriculture was simply 
unexpected and, of course, deliberate. There was never any talk about linking investment 
with agriculture. If at all there was a talk of quid pro quo, it was vis-à-vis investment and 
mobility of labour. As for the new issues, some trade analysts were hoping to strike a 
compromise on competition rather than on investment. A consensus on investment was 
beyond anybody’s imagination. Furthermore, on investment, there is no unanimity even 
among EU member-nations or their businesses. 
 
Why investment was included in the revised draft declaration? One answer could be that 
since the G-20 was acting tough on agriculture, the EU wanted to counter it by pushing 
investment on to the agenda. The second possibility was that since investment was the most 
contentious Singapore issue, it was selected as the trade-off issue only to antagonise 
developing countries purposely to guide the talks to the failure zone. And the gambit paid off.   
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III. RTAs: Going Parallel With Uruguay Round and WTO 
 
The global trading system has seen a sharp increase in regional trade agreements over the 
past two decades. According to World Trade Report 2003 of the WTO, a total of 259 RTAs 
had been notified to the GATT/WTO by the end of December 2002, although only 176 RTAs 
are currently in force. An additional 70 RTAs are estimated to be operational although not yet 
notified and about 70 are under negotiation3.  
 
This new wave of regionalism is not new. It has been a continuing part of the post-World 
War II trade landscape. However, there are three distinctive features of this trend of ‘new’ 
regionalism, which have been experienced in the decades of 1980s and 1990s. Firstly, the 
conversion of US to the regional approach. Secondly, the EU has further deepened and 
widened its economic integration. Finally, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation formed in 
1989 as the first intergovernmental arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region, with a timeline of 
completing their integration by 2020.       
 
III.1 US’ Conversion to FTAs, EU Widening and Formation of APEC  
 
While the recent rapid growth of RTAs began in the 1990s, the seeds of the development 
were arguably sown in the 1980s. Part of the impulse towards regionalism was driven then by 
the seemingly bleak prospects for progress on the multilateral agenda in the wake of the 
inconclusive 1982 GATT Ministerial meeting. Moreover, Western Europe was continuing its 
moves towards deeper and broader regional integration. Highly significant also was the 
decision of the United States to explore the preferential approach to trade. Prior to this, the 
United States had relied almost entirely on the GATT and the MFN principle to define its 
trade relations with other nations (WTO 2003).  
 
The United States signed its first free trade agreements (FTAs) in 1985 with Israel and then 
with Canada in 1989. Afterwards, the US, Canada, and Mexico formed the North American 
Free Trade Association (NAFTA) in 1994. At the Miami Summit in 1994, countries of the 
Western Hemisphere announced the plan to create a Free Trade Areas of America (FTAA). 
The Summit brought together 34 Hemispheric Heads of State who agreed to create a free 
trade area encompassing the entire continent (Cuba is excluded for political reasons) and to 
complete negotiations for the agreement by 2005. Here, it is worth mentioning that the 
Uruguay Round trade talks concluded in 1994 and a decision was taken to establish the WTO 
with effect from January 1995.  
 
When and if completed, the FTAA will be an extremely significant regional trading block 
comprising 34 developed and developing countries with a population of 750 million and a 
total income of nearly US$9 trillion.  
      
The post-Uruguay Round has also seen the further widening and deepening of the European 
Union. The EU has widened the integration through the Single European Act (SEA) and the 
Maastricht Treaty. Portugal and Spain joined in 1986 and some of the European Free Trade 
Area countries – Sweden, Finland, and Austria became members in 1995. Now, under the 
new expansion plan, the EU-15 will soon become EU-25.   
               
                                                 
3 In this estimate, all types of regional agreements are included: bilateral, plurilateral and preferential non-
reciprocal ones. 
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As mentioned above, the third major development was the formation of Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989, when the Uruguay Round of trade negotiation was 
at its peak. Started with 12 members in 1989, today APEC has 21 members – referred to as 
“Member Economies” – which account for more than 2.5 billion people, a combined GDP of 
US$19trillion and 47 per cent of world trade4.    
 
Until 1994, APEC remained a loose consultative forum with no ambition of creating yet 
another trading block. At their second APEC leaders meeting in November 1994 in Bogor, 
Indonesia, however, the 18 participating leaders declared their intention of turning APEC into 
a zone of free trade and investment by 2010, for APEC’s developed economies, and by 2020 
for its developing members.    
 
III.2 South-South Preferential Trade Agreements  
 
The new upsurge in RTAs not only resulted in qualitative and quantitative changes in 
regional integration involving North-North and North-South countries, but it has also ignited 
many Southern countries to work for free trade areas among themselves. In 1980s, attempts at 
regional integration were made in Latin America, Africa, and Asia with renewed vigour. In 
1980s and 1990s, many Southern countries underwent a period of structural adjustment and 
economic reform.  
 
In Latin America, MERCOSUR (the Common Market of the South) was formed in 1991 and 
the Group of Three in 1995. The Andean Pact and Central American Common Market 
(CACM) were resurrected in 1991 and 1993, respectively. According to some estimates, 
between 1990 and 1994 alone, 26 bilateral and regional trade agreements were signed among 
Latin American countries5.    
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the blocks in West Africa were reformed and reorganised. The 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) developed out of an earlier defence-
based organisation, Southern African Development Coordination Conference, and was 
supplemented – for many of its members – by Cross Border Initiative (CBI). The East 
African Cooperation sprang up where the East African Community had failed.  
 
The Middle East witnessed the development of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and in 1997 
Arab League members agreed to cut trade barriers over a 10-year period. In Asia, the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries developed 25 years of political 
cooperation into a free trade area in 1992, with the formation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA).        
 
III.3 Preferential Trade Agreement in South Asia 
 
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formed in 1985 as a 
political consultation entity. In its first year of existence, it had little success in promoting 
trade preferences among its members. Though the plan to create the South Asian Preferential 
Trade Area (SAPTA) was announced in 1993, the actual exchange of preferences remained 
extremely limited (Panagariya, 2002).  
 
                                                 
4 http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/about_apec.html , website visited on 20th November 2003.  
5http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/RI_map.html, website visited on 18th May 2001.          
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The SAPTA framework provides for periodic rounds of trade negotiations for the exchange 
of trade concessions on tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff measures using a combination of 
negotiating approaches. In view of the modest progress made in the initial years, the deadline 
for a free trade area, which was finally envisaged for 2001-2005, has been postponed to 2008 
for non-LDC members (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and 2010 for LDC members 
(Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Maldives).      
 
A major breakthrough, however, was made in January 2004 when during the 12th SAARC 
Summit, held at Islamabad, an agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was 
signed. The SAFTA agreement is slated to come into force from January 1, 2006 upon 
completion of formalities, including ratification by all contracting states and issuance of 
notification by the SAARC Secretariat. The SAFTA agreement, inter alia, includes trade 
facilitation measures like harmonisation of standards, reciprocal recognition of tests and 
accreditation of testing laboratories of contracting states and certification of products.  
 
The signing of the SAFTA agreement is a landmark in the evolution the SAARC since its 
formation in 1985. It marks a movement away from the mere tinkering with tariffs under 
SAPTA in order to establish a free trade area in the region. The commodity-by-commodity 
negotiations under SAPTA were proving highly laborious and time-consuming and had 
hardly made any impact on the intra-regional trade, which is still languishing below five per 
cent of the total global trade of the SAARC member states. The SAFTA agreement has the 
potentiality of going beyond its stated objective of liberalisation of trade in goods. A 
successful integration can make South Asia a magnet for vastly enhanced foreign investment 
and lead to a restructuring of the economies making the region one of the fastest growing and 
most competitive economic blocks (Dubey, 2004).        
 
IV. Impact of Cancun Collapse: Will RTAs Proliferate Further?  
 
No doubt, the world we are living in is a regionalised one. With the EU, NAFTA, APEC and 
MERCOSUR – just to mention a few – the global political economy is divided into regions. 
Already there has been a huge proliferation of RTAs in the last two decades. As regards 
regional trading agreements in a true sense, all possible permutations and combinations have 
been tried, except some pockets of East Asia involving Japan, China and Korea are still a 
virgin zone. Hence in the wake of Cancun collapse, the fear of its proliferation is little 
unwarranted. Nevertheless, the failed trade talks at Cancun may have some impact on it. 
 
IV.1 Possible Factors Influencing the Move Towards RTAs   
 
Firstly, the failure of multilateralism for the time being will strengthen the views of those 
who see regionalism being a ‘stepping stone’ towards multilateral trade liberalisation. The 
other viewpoint holds an opposite stance and sees regionalism being a ‘stumbling block’ with 
regard to globalisation. So far, this debate is rather inconclusive. 
 
Secondly, the mandate of Doha Development Agenda on RTAs will be diluted. Para 29 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration gives the green light to negotiations aimed at clarifying and 
improving disciplines and procedures under existing WTO provisions applying to RTAs. 
RTAs in the WTO context constitute a permitted departure from the most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) principle, which is permitted under Article XXIV of the GATT. By their very nature, 
such arrangements favour imports from members of the block, and discriminate against 
imports from non-members.  
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Thirdly, the Cancun fiasco may facilitate further deepening and widening of the existing 
RTAs. It is being increasingly recognised that effective integration requires more than 
reducing tariffs and quotas, i.e., going well beyond the stage of customs union. Many other 
barriers have the effect of segmenting and impending the free flow of goods, services, 
investments, and ideas. Therefore, wide-ranging policy measures are needed to remove these 
barriers. This so-called deep integration was first actively pursued in the Single Market 
Programme of the EU, and elements of this programme are now finding their way into the 
debate in other regional agreements (World Bank, 2000). 
 
Fourthly, there are chances of proliferation of mini trading alliances, especially bilateral trade 
agreements. There is a concern among countries that have traditionally avoided this approach. 
These countries also want some cushion to fall back upon should in case the momentum of 
multilateralism falters. Furthermore, there is a belief in the business community that, as 
product cycles get shorter and multilateral negotiating cycles get longer, quicker results may 
be obtained regionally (OECD, 2003).                
          
IV.2 Developments in Post Cancun 
 
IV.2.1 US’ Bilateral Deals and FTAA Negotiations  
The first salvo was fired by the US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick in his 14th 
September press conference, held immediately after the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial. In 
his post-conference press release he said that in the absence of trade liberalisation under the 
aegis of WTO, US would not wait but follow the path of bilateralism and regionalism. At 
present, the U.S. has free trade agreements with six countries, is negotiating with 14 more, 
and is pressing ahead to establish free trade throughout the Western Hemisphere.     
 
After failing to prevail upon developing countries at Cancun, US then tried to dictate the 
agenda of VIII FTAA Ministerial meeting, held at Miami, USA (17-21 November, 2003). In 
order to counter the growing influence of Brazil (leader of G-22) amongst the members of 
FTAA, the US has announced of bilateral agreements with some member countries. Brazil 
has already made the US bite the dust by forcing it to drop demands for stricter patent rights 
and greater protection for foreign multinationals.  
 
Brazil is also opposed to inclusion of investment, competition, and government procurement 
in trade agreements. However, the countries that have trade agreements with the US are - in 
principle – not opposed to the inclusion of these topics, since their respective treaties already 
include specific clauses on investment, competition policy and government procurement 
(ICTSD, 2003).  
 
Taking into account of above dynamics, the US, prior to the opening of the FTAA Ministerial 
meeting, announced its intention to launch trade negotiations with four Andean countries and 
Panama. The negotiations with Columbia and Peru would start in the second half of 2004 and 
with Ecuador and Bolivia sometime later. Negotiations with Panama are also slated to start 
during the second half of 2004.        
 
IV.2.2 EU’s Move: Wait and Watch 
 
Unlike US, the EU so far resisted the temptation to engage in bilateral free trade deals. The 
European Parliament in its resolution on the 5th Ministerial Conference of the WTO has 
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strongly supported multilateral trade agreements as the best mechanism for promoting free 
and fair trade to the benefit of all. The EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy has also 
reiterated on several occasions that the EU looks set to remain primarily focused on 
multilateral trade talks at the WTO. Here, it would be worthwhile to mention that 
Commissioner Lamy refused to launch fresh bilateral talks after he assumed his post in 1999.  
 
According to a “reflection paper” being crafted by the European Commission, the EU would 
face a number of problems in shifting its policy toward bilateral free-trade deals. One 
viewpoint says that opening the EU to bilateral deals could mean it would be flooded with 
requests for negotiations. Such deals are hard to negotiate in a grouping of 15 nations like the 
EU, where individual states might have sharply different views on which countries the EU 
should drop trade barriers with (Miller and Newman, 2003). 
        
However, the EU is going ahead to strike a free trade deal with the South American Mercosur 
trade block despite an earlier accord to delay such a treaty. The EU and Mercosur had 
previously agreed not to conclude an inter-regional deal before the end of the Doha round of 
WTO talks, which aim to finish in December 2004. But the failure of a WTO meeting in the 
Mexican resort city of Cancun in September has left hopes of finishing on time extremely 
slim. This frees ministers to cut the links with Doha.  
  
The EU and Mercosur started talks to conclude an Association Agreement in June 1999. 
Since then ten rounds of negotiations have taken place. The agreement comprises three 
chapters: political, co-operation and trade and economic. During the 7th Round of 
negotiations in April 2002, the political and co-operation chapters were virtually finalised.  
 
IV.2.3 East Asia: A Virgin Zone But Slowly Gaining Momentum 
 
Unlike the EU and NAFTA, East Asia appears to have achieved an amazing level of 
economic integration without relying on an institutional framework. East Asia, excluding 
Japan, – namely ASEAN, China, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong – sharply increased 
their intra-regional trade over the last two decades. In 2001, nearly 40 per cent of exports by 
East Asian economies were destined to the same region, up from 23 per cent in 1980. 
Likewise, their dependency on intra-regional trade in terms of imports 43.7 per cent in 2001 
was nearly double the 22.2 per cent in 1980. However, this figure on intra-regional trade is 
still far below the 61.9 per cent in EU but closing on the 46.3 per cent for NAFTA.       
 
Over the last few years several proposals have been mooted to form a broad Free Trade 
Agreement involving ASEAN, Japan, China and Korea. These countries want to reduce their 
dependence on the United States market and also cooperate on security issues. Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi of Japan has also put forward the proposal to create an East Asian 
community, which was incorporated in the Tokyo Declaration adopted at the Japan-ASEAN 
summit held in December 2003. The proposal called for a broad range of cooperation on the 
basis of the ASEAN plus Three (Japan, China and South Korea) framework, rather than 
specific economic integration.  
 
The biggest developments are Tokyo’s decision to join ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC) and the commitment to create a “comprehensive economic partnership” 
between Japan and ASEAN, which will include elements of a free trade area, by 2012. Japan 
is also hoping to start formal negotiations towards bilateral trade agreements with Thailand, 
Malaysia and the Philippines in 2004. Bilateral working parties are compiling reports to 
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assess the economic impact of trade agreements in each of the three cases. The reports are 
likely to conclude that further dismantling of trade barriers would be mutually beneficial.  
 
IV.2.4 South Asia: Following a Two-Track Approach 
 
When the Cancun Ministerial collapsed, many experts advanced the same old arguments that 
the inevitable consequence of not concluding multilateral trade negotiations to the 
satisfaction of major trading partners, is to drive them to the embrace of regional and bilateral 
trade arrangements. This argument is now being repeated with added emphasis that South 
Asia, especially India, stands to lose most heavily because of its not being a member of a 
regional or bilateral trade arrangement with developed countries.  
 
Irrespective of the situation that may emerge after the collapse of Cancun trade talks, India 
has followed a two-track approach over the last few years. On the one hand, India is actively 
trying to influence the WTO trade negotiations, while on the other, it has been involved in 
bilateral and regional trade negotiations too. Prior to Cancun Ministerial, India signed a 
framework trade agreement with the Mercosur trade block of Latin America. This sets in 
motion the process that will ultimately establish a ‘Free Trade Area’ between India and 
Mercosur.  
 
After Cancun, India signed free trade agreements with Singapore and Thailand (both ASEAN 
members). Following this is a similar agreement among China, Japan and India to create a 
broad East Asian group. India is also in the process of signing a PTA/FTA with Egypt.  
 
As regards other SAARC countries, recently Bangladesh and Pakistan have reached on an 
overall framework on the proposed FTA. Islamabad had consented to Dhaka's request to give 
her special trade preference under an FTA. Bangladesh also sought a longer time than 
Pakistan to phase out tariff under FTA and immediate free entry of its products to the 
Pakistani market. However, Bangladesh has reiterated that it would not have such an 
agreement with India if New Delhi fails to remove various trade barriers. Besides, Pakistan is 
also set to sign a FTA with Iran.   
 
In South Asia, an agreement giving effect to South Asian Free Trade Area was signed in 
January 2004 at Islamabad, which has already been discussed in Section III.3.  
 
V. Intra-SAARC Trade: Why it is Low? 
 
It is often argued that the intra-regional trade within SAARC countries is too low. In 2001, 
the intra-regional trade was only 4.9 per cent of the total trade (with members and non-
members) of the SAARC countries (WTO, 2003). Results of the gravity model show SAPTA 
so far is a no block. Estimates show that trade between India and Pakistan is 70 per cent 
lower than two otherwise identical economies (Frankel, 1997; Frankel and Wei, 1997). 
However, from the sub-regional economic perspective this conclusion is a bit ironic because 
several studies have established that SAARC countries can benefit enormously by 
cooperating economically and promoting regional trade (Srinivasan and Canonero, 1993, 
1995). 
 
Several arguments have been advanced for low regional trade among South Asian countries. 
One very common argument is the lack of trade complementarities. The South Asian 
countries export labour intensive products in which they have a better comparative advantage 
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in relation to the rest of the world (ROW). The volume of trade and the economic benefits 
from trading these products among themselves are limited. But there is a counter argument as 
well, saying, there is no hard evidence to endorse the argument of lack of complementarities. 
Many experts feel otherwise and argue that there is a need of proper research to find trade 
complementarities. 
 
Services trade, however, may provide a better scope to find trade complementarities among 
the South Asian countries. In the social sectors like health and education, there is a 
considerable opportunity of increasing intra-SAARC trade. Moreover, SAARC countries are 
vocal on their demand for greater liberalisation of trade in services under mode 4 of General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In order to counter it, developed countries, often, 
raise the issue of poor mobility of labour within South Asia itself. If India, who is a major 
demandeur of mode 4 liberalisation, demands their workers to move freely to developed 
countries then why it does not work for free movement of labour in its own region. Thus, if 
we have a greater mobility of labour within SAARC, it can be a stepping-stone in seeking 
greater market access for our labour in North.             
 
Secondly, the reason for low intra-regional trade until recently was not the absence of trade 
preferences but the lack of liberal trade policies in general. Once the countries in the region 
began to liberalise, their intra-regional trade expanded rapidly, which is very much evident 
from the data. In 1990, share of intra-regional trade was only 3.2 per cent, which has 
increased to 4.9 per cent in 2001 (WTO, 2003). It is noteworthy here that India, the largest 
economy of this region, embarked on the trade liberalisation path in 1991 in a big way.         
 
Thirdly, various studies show that a huge amount of border trade is taking place between the 
South Asian countries that remains unrecorded. Between several pairs of countries, such 
informal trade is considerably higher than the official trade flows. These informal trade flows 
are taking place not only to evade the high tariffs that must be paid on official trade, but also 
to carry out some trade that would have not been permitted at all. Hence, if we take into 
account such trade flows, intra-SAARC trade as a proportion of total SAARC trade would be 
higher than the estimates arrived at with the help of official trade statistics.   
    
VI. Intra-regional Trade: A Comparison of SAPTA with Other Southern RTAs 
 
Over the years a number of initiatives have been taken by the South Asian countries to 
liberalise intra-regional trade at unilateral, bilateral and regional levels. Despite these 
initiatives the proportion of regional trade and investments is still quite modest. On the other 
hand some other South-South regional integration have done exceedingly well in terms of 
promoting their intra-regional trade.  
 
In Table 1, a comparison has been made between various Southern RTAs. All these RTAs 
have been formed over the last two decades. South Asia has the lowest level of intra-regional 
trade among all. ASEAN and Mercosur have done extremely well by increasing their share to 
22.4 and 20.8 per cent respectively in 2001. Even the African RTAs, all of which were 
formed in 1990s, have done reasonably well in promoting their intra-regional trade.    
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Table 1 
Intra-Regional Export Shares: A Comparison of SAARC with other Southern RTAs 
 
 1990 2001 Year in force 
Latin America 
Andean Group 4.2 11.2 1988 
Mercosur 8.9 20.8 1991 
Africa 
COMESA* 6.3 5.2 1994 
SADC** 3.1 10.9 1992 
UEMOA 12.1 13.5 2000 
Asia 
ASEAN/AFTA 19.0 22.4 1992 
SAARC 3.2 4.9 1985 
 * Prior to 2000, data unavailable for Namibia and Swaziland 
** Prior to 2000, data unavailable for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland  
Sources: UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2002; WTO, International Trade Statistics 2002. 
 
 
VII. South Asia: Possible Options in Post-Cancun 
The above analysis suggests that whether it is good or bad, along with the increased global 
integration, regionalism was on the rise during the 1990s and in all probability it will grow 
further, may be not necessarily in numbers but definitely in quality. As mentioned earlier, the 
new wave of regionalism has resulted in further deepening and widening of the existing RTAs.  
 
Under the prevailing situation, the SAARC countries should continue with their two-track 
approach, giving primacy to promoting multilateral trade negotiations under the aegis of 
WTO. Since South Asian countries are still marginal players in global trade, the benefits out 
of multilateral agreements would be definitely larger than bilateral/regional trade treaties. 
Nevertheless, they should also try to work for meaningful PTAs/FTAs. As the current wave 
of regionalism has touched almost all the members of the WTO, South Asian countries 
cannot afford to flow against the stream. 
 
At present, the intra-regional trade in South Asia is very low, but it would be still beneficial if 
they work for deeper integration as these days regionalism goes well beyond cooperation on 
trade front alone. Moreover, the official trade data does not reflect the true picture, as a 
significant amount of trade is also taking place through informal channels. There are a few 
very successful examples of economic integration in Southern countries. South Asia can 
follow the pattern of ASEAN/AFTA and Mercosur, the two successful South-South RTAs.  
 
Lastly, one more pertinent question arises, whether South Asia should go for RTAs with 
developed countries or try to explore the possibility of forming South–South RTAs, 
especially with East Asian countries. Developed countries, like the US and the EU have 
traditionally been the major trading partners of South Asian countries. One viewpoint says 
that it would be unwise to go for such trade treaties, as these markets are relatively more open 
and signing bilateral trade treaties would be tantamount to giving market access to them to 
relatively more protected South Asian economies. 
 
Hence, South Asian countries can follow the “Look East” policy. India has already started 
making efforts in this direction. After Cancun Ministerial, India signed framework 
agreements with Thailand and ASEAN for their proposed FTAs.    
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